It sucks, for sure. But I find the quote from Jeff Gill to ring a little hollow. If anything (at least in Chicago), it seemed to me that Tallgrass has suffered from the proliferation of local SKUs at retail locations. Tallgrass used to stand out on shelves here, but was quickly overtaken by a sea of fresher, local options. Not to mention the other large regional and national brands with good reputations that have added to crowding shelf space in recent years.
I just don't see how people visiting local taprooms could kill a business that appeared to be built on pushing volume at large retail chains/grocers. Especially given the recent narrative that
more people choose to drink at home as opposed to going out to bars.
People still buy plenty of beer at places like Binny's. They're just not buying enough
Tallgrass beer for it to sustain it's business. If there's data supporting the quote, I'd really like to see it, because it would make for fascinating reading.
This is the "squeeze" (*not* a bubble, IMO) -- small producers growing too fast, entering markets that can't be serviced or sustained, ending up undercapitalized, and searching for "patient money," when they can't service debt*. Very similar to Smuttynose & Green Flash, in this sense.
And to your point,
yeahnatenelson -- here in Chicago, it looks more like the regional/national brands would rather play the taproom game themselves (Ballast Point, Goose, whichever comes next) while simultaneously pushing volume through retailers, where most of their beer is going to be sold anyway. What benefit could they reap by partnering with a handful of beer bars to "kill," taprooms? Wouldn't that force the smaller guys to go harder into distribution, creating more competition for tap handles, shelf placement, etc.?
*I haven't seen coverage as to whether Tallgrass's recapitalization efforts were to take out a lender. just speculating on that point.