At oral argument, the Association further contended that the Commissioner was improperly punishing Brady for destroying his cell phone because he was required to institute a new disciplinary action (so that Brady could then appeal any determination that he had destroyed his cell phone). This argument fails because, as set forth in the original disciplinary letter, Brady was punished for failing to cooperate, and it is clear from the Commissioners decision that Bradys cell phone destruction was part and parcel of the broader claim that he had failed to cooperate. Further, as we stated with regard to general awareness, nothing in Article 46 limits the arbitrators authority to reexamine the factual basis for a suspension by conducting a hearing. Additionally, the Commissioner did not increase the punishment as a consequence of the destruction of the cell phonethe four‐game suspension was not increased. Rather, the cell phone destruction merely provided further support for the Commissioners determination that Brady had failed to cooperate, and served as the basis for an adverse inference as to his participation in the scheme to deflate footballs.
Finally, any reasonable litigant would understand that the destruction of evidence, revealed just days before the start of arbitration proceedings, would be an important issue. It is well established that the law permits a trier of fact to infer that a party who deliberately destroys relevant evidence the party had an obligation to produce did so in order to conceal damaging information from the adjudicator. See, e.g., Residential Funding Corp. v. DeGeorge Fin. Corp., 306 F.3d 99, 10607 (2d Cir. 2002); Byrnie v. Town of Cromwell, 243 F.3d 93, 10712 (2d Cir. 2001); Kronisch v. United States, 150 F.3d 112, 126 (2d Cir. 1998). These principles are sufficiently settled that there is no need for any specific mention of them in a collective agreement, and we are confident that their application came as no surprise to Brady or the Association.